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The	 North	 American	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	 (NAFTA),	
which	was	initiated	during	the	Republican	administration	
of	George	H.W.	Bush	and	completed	during	the	Democrat	
administration	of	Bill	Clinton,	has	been	studied	intensively	
since	 it	went	 into	 effect	 in	 1994.	 Although	 an	 objective	
review	 of	 the	 literature	 suggests	 that	 NAFTA’s	 overall	
effects	have	been	 small	but	positive	 for	both	Mexico	and	
the	United	States,	Donald	Trump	has	called	 it	 the	 “worst	
trade	agreement	ever.”	Others	have	 claimed	 that	NAFTA	
beneϔits	Mexico	at	 the	 expense	of	 the	United	 States.	This	
brief	 revisits	 the	 evidence	 surrounding	 NAFTA,	 in	
particular,	and	free	trade	agreements,	in	general.		
There	are	many	ways	to	eval-
uate	 trade	 agreements.	 Per-
haps	the	best	place	to	start	is	
by	 evaluating	 how	 well	 an	
agreement	 achieved	 its	 stat-
ed	goals.	The	Preamble	to	the	
NAFTA	 lists	 ϐifteen	 goals.1	
Most	 focus	on	 increasing	the	
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Overall, NAFTA’s effects have 
been small but posiƟve for both 
Mexico and the United States.  
 
Free trade agreements lead to 
increased exports and imports.  
 
US exports are oŌen linked to 
US jobs. 
 
US consumers benefit 
significantly from imports.  
 
The overall benefits of trade 
outweigh the costs. 
 
2 volume	of	trade	by	reducing	barriers	to	trade	
and	 investment.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 since	NAFTA,	
trade	 and	 investment	 have	 signiϐicantly	 in-
creased	 between	 the	 three	NAFTA	 countries.	
In	 particular,	 goods	 traded	 between	 Mexico	
and	the	United	States	increased	by	more	than	
a	 factor	 of	 ϐive	 between	 1994	 and	 2015.2	 US	
exports	 to	 Mexico	 increased	 from	 $50.84	 to	
$235.7	billion,	while	US	 imports	 from	Mexico	
increased	from	$49.5	billion	to	$296.4	billion.	
Goods	traded	between	Canada	and	the	United	
States	more	than	doubled	over	the	same	peri-
od.	 In	 other	 words,	 NAFTA	 appears	 to	 have	
accomplished	its	primary	objectives.	
Since	US	imports	from	Mexico	increased	more	
than	 our	 exports	 to	 Mexico,	 some	 have	 sug-
gested	that	NAFTA	and	trade	agreements	like	
NAFTA	 beneϐit	 our	 trading	 partners	 much	
more	 than	 they	 beneϐit	 the	 United	 States.	 In	
the	case	of	Mexico,	however,	 the	 facts	do	not	
support	 the	 claim	 that	Mexico	has	beneϐitted	
more	 from	NAFTA	 than	 the	United	 States.	 In	
fact,	recent	evidence	suggests	that	earnings	in	
the	 two	 countries	 have	 grown	 at	 about	 the	
same	 rate	 since	 NAFTA.3	 	 Adjusted	 for	 inϐla-
tion,	 US	 GDP	 per	 capita	 increased	 steadily	
(with	the	exception	of	the	2001	and	2008	re-
cessions)	 from	 $36,566	 to	 $51,486	 between	
1992	and	2015	(in	constant	2010	US	dollars).	
Mexico’s	 GDP	 growth	 has	 experienced	 larger	
ϐluctuations	 (including	 the	 December	 1994	
peso	 crisis),	 but	 over	 the	 same	 time	 period	
Mexican	 GDP	 per	 capita	 increased	 from	
$7,509	 to	 $9,517	 (in	 constant	 2010	 US	 dol-
lars).4		See	ϐigure	1.	
If	Mexico	gained	more	than	the	United	States,	
the	 gap	 between	 Mexican	 and	 US	 incomes	
would	have	closed.	On	the	contrary,	 the	ratio	
of	 Mexican	 to	 US	 GDP	 per	 capita	 fell	 from	
20.5%	of	US	GDP	per	capita	in	1992	to	18.5%	
in	2015.	This	means	that,	at	 least	 in	 terms	of	
rising	incomes,	there	seems	to	be	no	evidence	
that	 Mexico	 has	 beneϐitted	 more	 than	 the	
United	States	from	NAFTA.	See	ϐigure	2.	
Furthermore,	 even	 though	 imports	 have	
grown	 rapidly,	 much	 of	 the	 value	 of	 the	 US	
imports	from	Mexico	includes	parts	produced	
in	the	United	States	that	are	exported	to	Mexi-
co	 for	 assembly	 and	 then	 re-exported	 to	 the	
United	 States.	 This	 arrangement,	 known	 as	
outsourcing,	 increases	 the	 demand	 for	 US	
workers	doing	higher-productivity	work.		
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Source:	The	World	Bank		and	author’s	calculations	
Figure	2:	Ratio	Mexican	to	US	GDP	per	capita	
(constant	2010	US$)	
Source:	The	World	Bank		
Figure	1:	GDP	per	Capita	(constant	2010	US$)	
Not	 all	 products	 imported	 from	Mexico	were	
assembled	from	US	parts.	Mexico	has	also	in-
creased	 its	 exports	 of	 many	 other	 goods,	 in-
cluding	 agricultural	 products	 (like	 avocados	
and	 tomatoes)	 that	 show	 up	 on	 the	 dinner	
tables	 of	 US	 consumers.	 In	 fact,	 trade	 theory	
and	 empirical	 evidence	 both	 suggest	 that	 US	
consumers	 beneϐit	 signiϐicantly	 from	 imports	
from	Mexico,	 in	particular,	 and	 from	 imports	
in	 general.	 Countries	 import	 goods	 that	 cost	
less	 than	 products	 produced	 at	 home.	 The	
availability	 of	 these	 cheaper	 products	 has	
helped	 lower-income	 families	 stretch	 their	
dollars	and	make	ends	meet.		
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF TRADE  
But	 doesn’t	 trade	 explain	 why	 families	 are	
poor	in	the	ϐirst	place?	Doesn’t	importing	low-
er-cost	products	cost	 jobs	at	home	and	lower	
incomes?	There	are	deϐinitely	some	examples	
of	 these	 adverse	 effects.	 Several	 mainstream	
academics5	have	produced	empirical	evidence	
suggesting	 that	 imports	 are	 associated	 with	
job	 losses.	 However,	 these	 effects	 are	 ex-
tremely	 localized	 and	 tend	 to	 affect	 less-
educated	workers	in	especially	hard-hit	areas	
(e.g.	 Detroit)	 and	 industries	 (e.g.	 apparel).	
Even	under	 the	assumption	that	these	effects	
are	entirely	due	to	trade,	the	number	of	work-
ers	who	have	been	adversely	affected	is	in	the	
thousands	 while	 the	 number	 of	 people	 who	
beneϐit	 from	 trade	 runs	 in	 the	 millions.	 The	
overall	beneϐits	of	trade	outweigh	the	costs.	
Furthermore,	 exports	 are	 unambiguously	 as-
sociated	with	 job	gains.	Overall	 in	2015,	11.5	
million	 US	 jobs	 were	 dependent	 on	 export	
trade.	 Of	 those	 jobs,	 Texas,	 California,	Wash-
ington,	 Illinois,	 and	 New	 York	 beneϐitted	 the	
most	with	2.8	million	jobs,	or	41%	of	jobs	re-
lated	 to	 goods	 exports	 (not	 including	 service	
exports).6		
MEXICO AS PARTNER 
Mexico	 is	 one	 of	 the	 United	 States’	most	 im-
portant	 trading	 partners.	 In	 2015,	 total	 ex-
ports	to	Mexico	accounted	for	11.8%	of	over-
all	US	exports	and	total	 imports	 from	Mexico	
accounted	 for	 11.5%	 of	 overall	 US	 imports.7	
The	 total	 value	of	 trade	between	Mexico	and	
the	United	States	exceeded	half	a	trillion	dol-
lars,	and	Mexico	was	the	second	largest	mar-
ket	 for	US	good	exports.	 (Our	other	neighbor	
and	 NAFTA	 trading	 partner—Canada—was	
ϐirst.)	
Trade	with	Mexico	is	especially	important	for	
Texas.	The	automobile	 sector	 in	particular	 in	
Texas	 is	very	closely	 integrated	with	produc-
tion	 in	 Mexico.	 Parts	 made	 in	 the	 United	
States	 are	 shipped	 to	 Mexico	 for	 assembly	
(often	 into	 more	 aggregated	 parts)	 and	 re-
turned	to	the	United	States	for	additional	pro-
cessing	 by	 working	 Texans.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	
most	accurate	way	to	think	of	the	NAFTA	eco-
nomic	 area	 is	 as	 one	 integrated	 economy	 ra-
ther	than	three	separate	ones.	That	 is,	rather	
than	 thinking	 of	 Mexico	 as	 a	 competitor,	 we	
should	think	of	Mexico	as	a	partner	in	our	na-
tional	production	process.	
My	own	research	supports	this	idea.	Compar-
ing	the	changes	in	employment	in	Mexico	and	
the	United	States	over	time	and	across	differ-
The	most	accurate	way	to	
think	of	the	NAFTA	
economic	area	is	as	one	
combined	market.	
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ent	 manufacturing	 industries,	 the	 data	 show	
that	when	employment	expands	in	the	United	
States,	it	also	expands	in	Mexico,	and	when	it	
contracts	in	the	United	States,	it	also	contracts	
in	 Mexico.8	 In	 other	 words,	 Mexican	 and	 US	
workers	are	complements	and	not	substitutes	
in	production.	The	anecdotal	evidence	we	ob-
serve	in	particular	 industries,	such	as	the	au-
tomotive	 industry,	 indicates	 that	 the	 strong	
connections	between	US	and	Mexican	employ-
ment	 are	 because	 they	 are	 part	 of	 the	 same	
production	process.	
IMPLICATIONS 
The	potential	 for	 future	gains	 from	globaliza-
tion	 for	US	consumers,	producers,	 and	work-
ers,	 is	very	large.	With	the	United	States	con-
stituting	only	5%	of	the	world	economy,	95%	
of	the	world's	consumers	(with	roughly	three	
fourths	of	 the	world’s	purchasing	power)	 lay	
outside	the	United	States.	Research	by	the	Pe-
terson	Institute	estimates	that	eliminating	the	
remaining	 global	 trade	 barriers	 would	 in-
crease	 the	 beneϐit	 America	 already	 enjoys	
from	 trade	 by	 another	 50%.9	 Free	 trade	
agreements	are	a	proven	way	to	improve	eco-
nomic	 conditions	 for	 both	 the	 United	 States	
and	our	trading	partners.	
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To share your thoughts 
on The Takeaway, 
please visit  
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